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A decade into the liberalization of the Turkish mobile industry, the sector remains one of the most concentrated in
Europe. This paper analyzes the links between the regulatory environment and competitive outcomes in the Turkish
context. The paper argues that 7 years of duopoly incumbency resulted in a significant first-mover advantage. It then
focuses on the role of the regulatory tools that could potentially restrain the incumbent operators’ first-mover advantage
and stimulate competition: national roaming, interconnection regulation, and number portability.
r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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Depending on how one counts, 8–12 years have passed since Turkish authorities decided to develop an
industry that would provide mobile telephony services at competitive prices. Today the Turkish mobile
industry is one of the most concentrated in Europe; three operators, Turkcell, Telsim, and Avea, have market
shares of 64%, 20%, and 16%, respectively. Although mobile penetration had increased from 22.3% in 2000
(last year of the duopoly period) to 39.4% in 2003, the penetration rate stood as the second lowest among the
OECD countries. The latest price comparisons for the mobile market indicate that Turkey had one of the
highest mobile telecommunication prices among the OECD countries in 2004.
The focus of this paper is the role of the regulatory environment in this outcome. In particular, the paper
emphasizes the negative impact on competition of delaying new entry until after 7 years of incumbency. By the
time the government decided to auction new licenses, the two incumbent mobile network operators (IMNOs),
Turkcell and Telsim, having rolled out their nation-wide networks, had significant first-mover advantages
proportional to their subscriber bases.
Given the delayed entry of the entrant mobile network operators (EMNOs), this paper argues that there
were three crucial policy tools that the authorities could use to stimulate effective competition in the mobile
market: national roaming, interconnection regulation, and number portability. The regulator had stronge front matter r 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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I˙ Atiyas, P. Dog˘an / Telecommunications Policy 31 (2007) 502–523 503intentions to implement the first two. Roaming was not successfully implemented. The interconnection regime
was conducive to new entry, but the new entrants did not make good use of it. Finally, even though 5 years
have passed since new entry, number portability is still not implemented.
In Turkey’s fixed telecommunications market, the authorities seemed reluctant for a long time to undertake
measures that would challenge the dominance of the incumbent operator. In the Turkish mobile industry, by
contrast, the regulatory attitude was much more inclined to promote competition. What makes the Turkish
story interesting is that poor market outcomes were obtained despite this more pro-competitive attitude. This
is not a simple case of lousy intentions or downright bad policy. The Turkish mobile industry brings out the
challenges of regulating an industry of this complexity, especially after having long-delayed entry. This paper
provides an overall picture of the Turkish mobile industry, and analyzes the potential links between the above
mentioned regulatory tools and competitive outcomes in the Turkish context.
There are several lessons that can be drawn from the Turkish experience. The most important is that the
Turkish experience confirms the existence of significant first-mover advantages in the mobile telecommunica-
tions industry. These advantages are amplified by the existence of tariff mediated network externalities and
switching costs. Moreover, the degree of first-mover advantage increases with the length of the incumbency
period. The policy conclusion that can be derived from this observation is that promoting simultaneous rather
than sequential entry is more likely to generate a competitive environment. Once first-mover advantage results
in dominance, that dominance is difficult to break. A related conclusion has to do with the importance of
foresight: roaming policy would have had much higher chances of success if roaming obligations were not
imposed as an afterthought, but were included in the original concession agreements of the IMNOs. Another
lesson that can be extracted from the Turkish experience is that correct regulations may become ineffective if
the legal environment lacks cohesion and competence and allows for opportunistic behavior. Roaming policy
was rendered ineffective by legal challenges by IMNOs and what is generally believed to be mishandling by
civil courts. The case of interconnection policy shows that correct regulations may fail to be effective because
intended beneficiaries may fail to make good use of it.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents a description of the regulatory environment
in the telecommunications industry. Section 3 provides a brief history of the development of the Turkish
mobile market. Section 4 examines the impact of regulatory policies on the evolution of competition. Section 5
discusses the main lessons that can be extracted from the Turkish experience, provides recommendations and
concludes.
2. Background: the regulatory environment
In line with most international experience, telecommunications services in Turkey used to be provided by a
state monopoly (Posts, Telegraph and Telephone, PTT). Liberalization of telecommunications equipment
occurred early on in the 1980s, along with the privatization of equipment manufacturers that were subsidiaries
of PTT. In 1994, as part of an overall orientation towards privatizing state owned assets, telecommunications
services were separated from Post and Telegraph, and Turk Telekom A.S. (TTAS) was established as a state
economic enterprise and a joint stock company (Fig. 1).1
The first important step in liberalization was the authorization of two private companies to provide mobile
services over the GSM 900 standard in 1994. These companies, Turkcell and Telsim, had revenue agreements
with TTAS until 1998, at which time they were issued licenses by the Ministry of Transport. Contrary to the
practice of many European countries, TTAS was not initiated to take part in the mobile business, which
evolved as a duopoly until 2001.
Various attempts were made to privatize TTAS in the 1990s, but these failed due to legal and constitutional
challenges. The landmark law regarding liberalization and regulatory reform in the telecommunications
industry was amending Law No. 4502, adopted in January 2000. The Law prescribed that the monopoly rights
of TTAS would end on December 31, 2003. It also established the Telecommunications Authority (TA) as an
independent regulatory body, and effectively transferred the regulatory functions of the Ministry of Transport
to that agency.1For details on the regulatory framework for telecommunications industry see OECD (2002), Atiyas (2005), and Burnham (2006).
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2005. Hence, as part of the accession process, Turkey will eventually adopt the regulatory framework for
electronic communications that is in place in the European Union. The regulatory framework that has been
emerging in Turkey in the last few years is largely inspired by that in the European Union.2 A case in point is
the interconnection regime which played an important role in the evolution of the mobile industry. The
Ordinance on Interconnection and Access (May 2003) stipulates voluntary commercial agreements for access
and interconnection, with the TA intervening for dispute resolution in case parties fail to reach an agreement.
In such cases, the TA may impose the terms of an agreement. According to the Ordinance the TA has
authority to impose access and interconnection obligations on all operators, if it deems that refusal to provide
access or interconnection or imposition of unreasonable terms would hinder the emergence of a competitive
market. A distinguishing feature of the Turkish regime is that it stipulates mandatory domestic roaming
obligations, a topic that will be discussed in detail below.
Turkey has a Law on the Protection of Competition which is enforced by the Competition Authority (CA). The
CA has taken a number of significant decisions in the telecommunications industry involving cases of abuse of
dominant position by incumbents in both the fixed and wireless segments. There is some ambiguity in the relevant
laws regarding the division of authority between the TA and CA, and the two agencies have displayed some
disagreement about their respective boundaries of authority. The evolving tendency is that the CA does not
investigate allegations of competition law violations when actions in question are in areas regulated by the TA.
The attitudes of the TA and especially the Ministry towards competition in the wireline and wireless
segments were very different. The Ministry had only a half-hearted commitment to the development of
competition in the wireline industry. The prospective privatization of Turk Telekom prompted the authorities
to slow down the introduction of competition in expectation of higher privatization revenues. By contrast,
both the Ministry and the TA were much more aggressive towards the mobile industry. This is partly
explained by the fact that Turk Telekom became a new entrant in the mobile business, and the Ministry’s
protective attitude towards Turk Telekom led it to take a more pro-entry posture in that segment. This was
evident both in roaming and interconnection policy, as discussed in Section 4.
3. The development of the Turkish mobile market
3.1. Phase I—the duopoly period (1994– 2001)
Two IMNOs, Turkcell and Telsim, started to provide cellular mobile telephony services in 1994, through
revenue sharing agreements with Turk Telekom. Turkcell was a joint venture between Sonem Holding2Some divergences exist. See Atiyas (2005) for details.
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Table 1
Phase I and II—basic statistics for the Turkish mobile industry
Phase I (Duopoly) Phase II
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Subscription
Total number 1000 175 437 806 1610 3506 8122 16,133 19,573 23,323 27,888 34,708
% Change (prv. year) 150 84 100 118 132 99 21 19 20 24
Per 100 inhabitants 0.3 0.7 1.3 2.6 5.5 12.6 24.7 28.6 33.5 39.4 48
Revenues
Total in million USD 61 143 302 622 417 2304 3485 2850 2816 3656 4765
Per subscriber in USD 347 327 375 386 119 284 216 114 121 131 137
Source: ITU.
I˙ Atiyas, P. Dog˘an / Telecommunications Policy 31 (2007) 502–523 505(currently Telia Sonera), a Finnish telecommunications company, and C- ukurova group, then the third largest
conglomerate in Turkey. Telsim initially was a partnership between Rumeli Holding, Alcatel, and Siemens,
but Rumeli Holding, a Turkish group owned by the Uzan family, active in a variety of sectors including
energy and banking, very quickly became the sole owner. The revenue agreements stipulated that Turk
Telekom would obtain 67% of the revenues, and the rest would be retained by the operators.3 All
infrastructure investments were to be undertaken by the operators themselves, but the ownership of the
facilities would be retained by Turk Telekom.
An important turning point in the development of the industry was in 1998, when the revenue sharing
agreements were replaced by 25-year concession agreements signed between the operators and Ministry of
Transport. As a result of these agreements, the operators were granted licenses, for which each paid 500
million US dollars, and obtained the ownership of infrastructure as well. As shown in Table 1, the subscriber
base of mobile telephony increased substantially after 1998, jumping from about 3.5 million subscribers in
1998 to 16 million subscribers in 2000. The change in the contractual arrangement from a revenue sharing
agreement to a license produced two important consequences. First, it introduced price competition: Under
the revenue sharing agreement retail mobile call tariffs were determined by Turk Telekom, whereas under
the license arrangement they began to be set by the mobile operators. According to ITU data, the ensuing
price competition between the two operators resulted in a rapid reduction of the price of a 3-min call from
over 1 US dollar to around 60 cents within a year in 1998. In addition to tariff reductions, both operators also
started granting handset discounts (daily Hurriyet, June 14, 1998). These changes must have led to a rapid
increase in demand. In addition to injecting competition, the change in the contractual framework also
affected investment incentives.
Compared to a revenue sharing agreement, a license is a higher powered incentive contract. Under a revenue
sharing agreement revenue passed over to Turk Telekom acted as a tax on earnings, reducing incentives to
invest. By contrast, a license arrangement makes the operator the residual claimant of earnings, providing
stronger incentives for investments and network rollout. Indeed, Turkcell investments increased from 136
million USD in 1997 to over 1 billion USD in 1999.4
Throughout the duopoly period, Turkcell had larger market share than Telsim. This is partly due to the fact
that Telsim entered the market a few months later than Turkcell in 1994. More importantly, Telsim’s activities
were suspended between November 1995 and July 1996 because it was found to violate the revenue agreement.
These effectively meant that Turkcell gained substantial first-mover advantage over Telsim. The suspension of
Telsim’s license also dealt a heavy blow on Telsim’s reputation, and Telsim was never able to challenge
Turkcell’s dominance in the market. In terms of number of subscribers, Turkcell’s share was about 69%
in 1999 and 2000.5 In fact, Turkcell’s dominance, commanding a market share (in terms of number of3See Yilmaz (2000, p. 47).
4See Competition Authority, Decision No. 01-35/347-95, p. 12, Table 6.
5See Competition Authority, Decision No. 01-35/347-95, Table 1.
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share in revenue, the market share of Turkcell was even higher. Between 1998 and 2000, an average Turkcell
subscriber’s monthly usage was about 140 against 41min for an average Telsim subscriber; in terms of
revenues, the market share of Turkcell was above 80% in that period.6
Turkcell’s growth strategy during that period entailed exclusive agreements with handset importers/
distributors and retail dealers. Through these exclusive contracts, Turkcell was able to prevent distributors of
major brand (e.g. Ericcson and Panasonic) handsets from marketing Telsim SIM cards and subscriptions, and
effectively bundled these handsets with Turkcell subscriptions. Telsim filed a complaint to the CA in
September 1999, arguing that Turkcell’s exclusive agreements with handset distributors and dealers distorted
competition and acted as barriers that impeded Telsim’s entry. The CA concluded that Turkcell’s practices
amounted to infringement of the Law on Protection of Competition.3.2. Phase II—new entry and the quadropoly period (2001– 2004)
Towards the end of the 1990s the Government decided to award three new GSM licenses. Two of these
licenses were to be sold through auctions to private parties. The third would be sold to Turk Telekom. Turk
Telekom, in turn would establish a mobile telecommunications subsidiary.
As the auction design indicates, the government was either unaware of the trade-off between promoting
competition and raising revenues from the auctions, or had a stronger preference over revenues: A sequential
auction was designed for the sale of the first two licenses, and the winning bid of the first auction would act as a
minimum price in the second auction. The first tender was held in April 2000 and the license was won by Is-Tim, a
consortium of Is Bank, a Turkish commercial bank, and the mobile phone arm of Telecom Italia, at an
unexpectedly high price of 2.5 billion US dollars. Given the high starting price, no bidder participated in the second
auction and the second license was not sold. The second highest bid in the first auction was 1.35 billion USD.
The Turkish GSM auction made it into the economics literature. Binmore and Klemperer (2001) presented
it as an example of bad auction design because it allowed gaming. They, along with many observers in Turkey,
argued that the winner of the first auction prevented entry into the second auction by bidding a price higher
than what the license would be worth if the second license was also sold resulting in an additional player in the
market, and therefore, higher competition. Other people argued that Is-Tim did not intend to act strategically
and simply overestimated the value of the license. As a result, it is not even clear whether the government
achieved its revenue objective.
The third license was sold to Turk Telekom at the same price paid by Is-Tim. Is-Tim started operations in
March 2001 under the brand name Aria. Turk Telekom’s subsidiary, Aycell, started operations in December 2001.
Table 1 shows the development of the market after new entry. Penetration rates have continued to increase,
reaching 48% in 2004. Revenues, however, have shown a slower growth and revenues per subscriber have
declined significantly. There are several reasons for this. First, Aria and Aycell entered the mobile market
during a major macroeconomic crisis. As a result of financial crises in November 2000 and February 2001,
gross domestic product declined by more than 9% in 2001. The impact of the crisis on the mobile industry was
severe. Table 1 shows that total revenues in the mobile industry declined from 3.5 billion USD in 2000 to 2.8
billion in 2001–2002. The second reason was heavy taxation. In addition to an 18% value added tax, the
mobile industry suffers from a special consumption tax of 25%. This tax was initially intended as a temporary
measure to meet the fiscal cost of a major earthquake that occurred in 1999, but has since then become
permanent.
The significant decrease in per-subscriber revenues from USD 216 in 2000 to USD 114 in 2001 can be
attributed to the effect of entry.7 However, this could also be partly explained by the increased proportion of
pre-paid customers over time. Pre-paid subscriptions generally generate less revenue than post-paid
subscribers, and proportion of pre-paid subscribers had increased from 44% in 2000 to 62.4% in 2001.86See Competition Authority, Decision No. 01-35/347-95, p. 9, Tables 2 and 3.
7According to the OECD (2005) data, there was a downward trend in per-subscriber revenues even before entry, from 1997 to 2001. This
data also suggests a lower decrease—about 28% in per-subscriber revenues right after entry (from 2000 to 2001).
8See OECD (2005).
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Table 2
Mobile operators’ market shares
Mobile Operators Market Shares (%)
Phase I Phase II
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Turkcell 78.0 68.0 80.0 76.9 68.5 69.2 69.0 67.0 67.3 67.9 67.0 63.0
Telsim 22.0 32.0 20.0 23.1 31.5 30.8 31.0 29.2 25.4 19.6 19.0 20.5
Aria – – – – – – – 2.7 5.1 – – –
Aycell – – – – – – – 1.1 2.1 – – –
Avea – – – – – – – – – 12.5 14.0 16.5
Source: 1994–2000: Turkiye Vakiflar Bankasi (2001). 2001: Turkcell Annual Report 2001 and www.interpro.com. 2002–2003:
www.hangioperator.com. 2004: Is Investment (2005). 2005: www.internethaber.com.
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the dominance of Turkcell, whose market share remained at around 67% during 2001–2004. Telsim’s market
share declined from about 30% in 2001 to 20% in 2003–2005. The new entrants’ total market share gradually
increased from below 4% in 2001 to 16% in 2005.3.3. The current state of the industry: 2+2 ¼ 3
The government intended to support new entry by imposing roaming obligations on the IMNOs.
Specifically, Law No. 4502 mandated that ‘‘mobile telecommunication, data operators or operators of other
services and infrastructure as determined by the Authority are also required to satisfy reasonable,
economically proportionate and technically feasible roaming requests of other operators’’. In addition,
Article 35 of the concession agreement between Is-Tim and the TA states that an operator may sign roaming
agreements with other operators and requires the regulator ‘‘to provide a necessary, sufficient and fair
competitive environment since Is-Tim entered the market’’.9 It was generally acknowledged in the industry
that the Ministry of Transport had made a verbal promise to Is-Tim during the sale of the license that Is-Tim
would have roaming rights.
For reasons that will be examined in detail below, to the apparent embarrassment of the Turkish authorities
Is-Tim ended up not being able to obtain roaming services from either of the incumbent operators. In 2003
TIM threatened to withdraw from Turkey. In the end, Is-Tim and Aycell decided to merge to form TT&TIM,
with TIM and Turk Telekom holding ownership of 40% each and Is-Bank holding the remaining 20%. Hence
the number of operators in the industry was thereby reduced to 3.
The final important change in the industry occurred when Telsim was taken over by the Turkish Deposit
Insurance Fund (TDIF). This happened because TDIF took over Imar Bank of the Uzan family that held
majority share in Telsim. Telsim was subsequently bought by Vodafone.4. Analysis
Following 7 years of incumbency by Turkcell and Telsim, the effect of entry on enhancing competition was
only mild. The new entrants, Aria and Aycell, together had a market share of 3.8% upon their year of entry,
which only increased to 7.2% in the following year.10 Eventually the entrants failed to survive as separate
entities. As discussed below, the purchasing power parity (PPP) adjusted price comparisons suggest that9Quoted in Dutz, Us, and Yilmaz (2005).
10Exact figures differ across sources. For example, according to Merrill Lynch (2004), the total market share of new entrants was 2% at
the end of 2001, and 5% at the end of 2002 (see Table 107).
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end of Phase II.
Concentration indexes are often used as indicators of degree of competition. Although concentration
indexes are higher in mobile telecom markets than markets with no significant entry barriers, they are
meaningful for cross-country comparisons, as well as for within-country comparisons over time.
The concentration indexes, computed as Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), are suggestive of poor market
performance for the post-entry Turkish mobile market.11 By the end of the quadropoly period, in 2003,
Turkey had the second highest market concentration index, 0.51, among the OECD countries that had 4
MNOs.12 The concentration index in the Turkish mobile market in this year was even higher than all other
OECD countries that had 3 operators.13
In fact, the concentration index in the Turkish mobile market with four MNOs, was comparable to those
countries that had only two MNOs: Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Slovak Republic, with HHIs of 0.53,
0.50, and 0.51, respectively. Regardless of the number of active MNOs, the Turkish dominant operator,
Turkcell, had the largest market share, 68.1%, compared to any dominant operator in the OECD countries
(except in Mexico).14
New entry and competition was expected to increase the penetration rate significantly. Between the last year
of Phase I (2001) and the last year of Phase II (2003), penetration rates increased from 22.3% to 39.4%. At
first sight such an increase could be interpreted as a relatively significant positive effect of entry. However, one
should note that the penetration rate after such an increase still stood as the second lowest among all OECD
countries.
Reasons behind this disappointing outcome are suggested below.
Timing of entry has a significant impact on the competitive structure in the mobile telecoms market due to
the first-mover advantage enjoyed by the IMNOs.15 Gruber (1999) argues that the market shares of MNOs in
Europe suggests the presence of a first-mover advantage. By the end of 1997, in countries like Denmark and
Germany, where the GSM licenses were granted simultaneously, the operators typically had similar market
shares, whereas in countries like Ireland, Italy and Spain, where there was a time lag between the first and the
second entry, market shares showed large disparities in favor of the first entrant.
This paper claims that the degree of first-mover advantage is likely to increase with the length of the
incumbency period, and in the absence of proper regulatory policies, entrants are likely to fail to compete
effectively with well-established incumbents. This is because longer incumbency often implies larger
asymmetries between the IMNOs and EMNOs in terms of (i) geographical coverage and (ii) subscriber
base upon entry, and both asymmetries feed the first-mover advantage of the IMNOs. The latter feeds the
first-mover advantage, in particular in the absence of a sound interconnection regulation, since it allows for
‘‘tariff mediated’’ externalities through the large price dispersions in on-net and off-net calls. Last, but not the
least, the presence of switching costs tend to amplify the degree of first-mover advantage, which calls for a
further caution for regulatory policies.
The impact of first-mover advantage generated by sequential entry (albeit with a relatively short time lag)
was clearly evident in the first phase. As discussed above, the fact that Telsim entered later than Turkcell and
that its activities were subsequently suspended for about 7 months helped Turkcell to establish and consolidate
its dominance. The time lag between the entry of IMNOs and EMNOs, and hence its competitive impact, was
much more dramatic. Because Turkcell already had a first-mover advantage over Telsim, and Telsim already
had much lower market share, the delay mainly benefited Turkcell and Telsim did not have much of a first-
mover advantage over the EMNOs. In what follows, the paper focuses on this second phase, and discusses the11One other criteria for the performance of mobile markets is the presence of virtual mobile operators (MVNO). Currently, there are no
MVNOs in Turkey.
12HHIs are computed using OECD (2005) data on the market shares of MNOs (see p. 46, Table 2.6).
13Except for Iceland, which effectively had two MNOs, since the third MNO had only a 0.3% market share.
14The average market share of the largest MNOs in the OECD countries is 48.87%.
15Gruber (1999) states two main reasons as to why a first-mover advantage may arise in the telecoms markets. The incumbent operators
usually get the best customer base, that is, the customers with the highest willingness to pay, and they also recover the capital costs of
setting up their network more quickly than their followers. The former source of first-mover advantage suggests the existence of switching
costs in the market.
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factor the paper also discusses the related regulatory policy that can help in moderating the first-mover
advantage.
4.1. Geographical coverage and national roaming
Geographical coverage is one of the main determinants of quality of service in the mobile telecom markets.
Consumers value larger geographical coverage, and all else being equal, prefer the MNO with the largest
coverage. It is often not possible for firms to build a national coverage prior to the launch of their network
services, and consumers’ choice do not depend per se on the ownership of the infrastructure that conveys the
service. Therefore, national roaming is a viable alternative for extending geographical coverage, and can be
particularly vital during the initial phases of new entry, when EMNOs need to gain the critical mass to survive
their business.
Although networks with symmetric-size coverages may voluntarily engage in roaming,16 the IMNOs which
already provide a national coverage may be reluctant to provide roaming services to EMNOs, which typically
have small initial coverage. There are very few papers that formally analyze incentives for roaming. Valetti
(2003) provides a model in which firms simultaneously set their coverage, then negotiate for roaming, and then
compete with prices. He shows that in such a setting, firms do not have incentive to roam (unless they collude
on prices), as they enjoy a softer competition with different network coverages, which constitute a quality
variable. If firms can collude in prices, however, they can avoid expensive duplication of networks, and count
on the roaming agreements to provide services in the non-covered areas. While his model gives some good
insights for simultaneous network roll out, one needs a different setting to analyze sequential entry, where
IMNOs have already built their network and reputation, locked-in some customers, and face smaller EMNOs
for competition. In such a case, IMNOs are likely to deny roaming, in particular, if EMNOs find it difficult to
reach the critical subscriber base in the absence of roaming.
Foros, Hansen, and Sand (2002) consider two symmetric-sized MNOs, and show how incentives of firms
with respect to quality of roaming may differ depending on whether the firms collude in the investment stage
or not. They show that if firms set their investments cooperatively, the equilibrium quality of roaming
coincides with the social optimum (which is not the case when firms invest non-cooperatively). They also
extend their model to analyze roaming incentives in the presence of a mobile virtual network operator
(MVNO).17 They show that in the presence of a MVNO, there is a little scope for regulating quality of
roaming both under cooperative and non-cooperative investments.
Although the nature of roaming agreements between MNOs is different than the access agreements that
take place between MVNOs and MNOs,18 conditions under which voluntary access may emerge might be
common in both cases.
Bourreau, Hombert, Pouyet, and Schutz (2006) state the following reasons for MNOs granting an access to
MVNOs on voluntary basis: using spare wholesale capacity, generating additional wholesale revenues, and
addressing market niches that the existing MNOs do not reach very effectively. The authors develop a model
in which vertically integrated firms (MNOs) interact on an upstream market to provide wholesale services to
downstream competitors (MVNOs). They show that MNOs are willing to contract with MVNOs not only
because it generates additional wholesale revenues, but also because it contributes to moderating competition
on the retail market. They also show that MNOs might have strong incentives to coordinate on a quasi-
collusive equilibrium, in which the wholesale prices are high.
According to Dewenter and Haucap (2006) incentives of MNOs to open their networks mainly depend on
the mode of competition and the degree of product differentiation. Drawing on a static competition model, the16Indeed, in Turkey, the two IMNOs, Turkcell and Telsim, relied on voluntary roaming agreements over the course of their network
expansion.
17The authors’ definition of roaming is a broad one and includes granting access to the MVNO. More importantly, they assume away
any side payments between the operators that engage in roaming.
18Technically roaming is a capacity sharing agreement that requires a two-way access between the operators. Differently, the nature of
the access problem between the MVNOs and MNOs is one-way, and for that matter resembles more the one-way access problem in the
fixed line telecom markets (e.g., through local loop unbundling).
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MVNOs are sufficiently differentiated, so that benefits through access revenues outweigh the competition
effects. They also show that incentives to grant an access to MVNOs are greater under Cournot competition
than under Bertrand competition, since industry profits are less sensitive to the degree of differentiation under
the former.
Then, the question is whether regulators should oblige the IMNOs to roam with smaller EMNOs. As stated
in the Intug (2003) position paper on National Roaming, imposition of national roaming may play an
important role in ensuring effective market entry for operators, and can also improve MNOs’ services in rural
and remote areas. Requiring second-generation operators to provide roaming services to second-generation
operators (‘‘2G/2G roaming’’) has not been a widely used policy. In Europe, under the 1998 framework (that
is, before countries started to adopt the 2003 EU regulatory framework for electronic communications) the
only countries that imposed mandatory roaming obligations were Denmark, Greece, Italy, and Norway.19 Of
these, Greece still has mandatory statutory roaming obligations on all operators. Under the 2003 framework,
roaming obligations can only be imposed as part of remedies on operators that have significant market power
(SMP) in the market ‘‘for access and call origination on mobile telephone networks’’, that is, market 15 as
identified in the European Commission Recommendation on Relevant Markets. As of fall 2006, the only
countries that have identified 2G/2G roaming obligations as one of the remedies that can be imposed on
MNOs in market 15 are Denmark, Norway, Spain, and Sweden. However, as a result of market analyses,
Denmark and Sweden have decided that there is effective competition in their relevant market, which means
that no obligations can be imposed on any of the operators. Hence in Western Europe, 2G/2G roaming
obligations can be imposed only in Greece, Norway, and Spain. However, regulators have been more willing
to require 2G operators to provide roaming services to operators that have licenses for third generation mobile
services (‘‘2G/3G roaming’’). In fact, all countries in Western Europe (except Germany and Netherlands) do
have such obligations.20
Once the IMNOs roll out their networks, imposing roaming obligations on IMNOs upon entry can be pro-
competitive, that is roaming may enhance competition ex post.21 This is true in particular, if the same
competitive outcome cannot be reached in the absence of mandatory roaming, in a reasonable time frame.
However, mandatory roaming is also likely to reduce EMNOs’ incentives to build their infrastructure, which is
the reason why roaming obligations are often complemented with a sunset clause. In Turkey, the entrants’
license conditions explicitly required them to carry out sufficient investments in infrastructure so as to reach a
coverage ratio22 of 50% in 3 years and 90% in 5 years. Hence, the roaming obligations imposed on the
IMNOs were considered as a temporary remedy to facilitate entry and expansion of the EMNOs’ subscriber
base. Since the incumbency period was quite long, and the IMNOs had almost a full national coverage at the
timing of the entry, imposition of national roaming had a great potential to stimulate competition.
As recounted in Appendix A, the distinct feature of the Turkish experience is that the authorities did impose
national roaming obligations but failed to enforce it. The concession agreements that were granted to the
IMNOs in 1998 did not mention any roaming obligations. However, Law No. 4502 and ensuing secondary
legislation authorized the TA to impose roaming obligations on mobile operators, exercise dispute resolution,
and, ultimately, to set the terms and conditions of an agreement in case parties failed to reach an agreement by
themselves (which the TA did). However, IMNOs challenged the decisions of the TA both at the civil and
administrative courts and were able to obtain injunctions against the terms and conditions determined by the
TA. IMNOs also applied for international arbitration. Ironically, both the IMNO and the EMNO filed a
lawsuit against the TA at the International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce,
the former for the imposition of roaming, and the latter for not having it. In the end, the roaming issue was19The information on roaming policies presented in this paragraph are taken from Cullen International, Western Europe Cross Country
Analysis; available at www.cullen-international.com.
20By an interesting contrast, none of the new members of the European Union countries have any 2G/3G roaming obligations.
21One should note that mandatory roaming may reduce IMNOs’ ex ante incentives to invest in infrastructure. However, this paper does
not focus on ex ante incentives here, as in Turkey, by the time the EMNOs were granted the licenses, both IMNOs had almost full national
coverage networks.
22This is defined as the ratio of population that would have access to mobile services.
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International Court of Arbitration rejected Turkcell and Telsim’s claims.
Note that to be effective, roaming policy had to be implemented without delay, especially given the sunset
clauses in the entrants’ licenses. The delays generated through the legal challenges basically reduced or even
eliminated any additional effect roaming policy could have had on the development of competition. Since
the details of the TA’s proposed terms and conditions are not public, it is not possible to evaluate whether the
TA could have been more effective in dispute resolution (whether, for example, these conditions imposed
excessive costs on the IMNOs). There is general agreement, however, that IMNOs would have been less
successful in delaying implementation if the legal environment was more cohesive, and had more expertise
in dealing with issues related to telecommunications regulation and competition. In particular, it is generally
accepted that in Turkey a civil court should not have adjudicated administrative decisions. One important
remedy in that respect is to make the Council of State, the high administrative court, the body for appeals
against TA decisions, rather than lower level administrative courts (which is currently the case) and to
endow them with sufficient expertise. Still, some residual legal uncertainty is often sufficient to provide
opportunities for legal challenges, which are in turn sufficient to generate delay. As argued in Appendix A
in some more detail, the best way to eliminate legal uncertainty with respect to roaming was to have
included roaming obligations explicitly in the IMNOs licenses when they were issued back in 1998.
Such foresight would have eliminated all grounds for frivolous legal challenges and also absolved the
authorities from having to impose what could be construed as costs on IMNOs that were not part of the
original bargain.
4.2. Tariff-mediated externalities: regulation of interconnection and price competition
The cost of a mobile call is generally thought to entail three components: call origination, call transmission
and call termination. In countries where the ‘‘calling-party pays’’ principle holds, the MNO that originates a
call that terminates in a rival’s network (off-net call) pays a termination charge to that network. The physical
cost of originating and terminating a call is considered to be not too different. However, the actual cost of an
off-net call to the originating MNO depends on the terminating charge that the originating MNO pays to the
terminating MNO. Hence, the call termination charge is an important determinant of the cost, and therefore
the retail tariff of off-net calls.
When MNOs are allowed to set retail tariffs that discriminate between on-net calls (i.e. calls terminating on
their own networks) and off-net calls, they may set high termination charges thereby increasing the cost of off-
net calls relative to on-net calls. This, in turn induces MNOs to set the retail off-net tariffs higher than retail
on-net tariffs. This creates a ‘‘tariff-mediated externality’’ in the sense that consumers are better off if the
people they want to call are in the same network. Everything else being equal, this makes MNOs with larger
subscriber base more attractive. This not only makes switching from IMNOs to EMNOs less desirable, but
also attracts non-attached customers towards IMNOs. Therefore, by setting call termination charges at a high
level, IMNOs can make it difficult for new entrants to expand their subscriber base and acquire market share.
This has indeed been the case in the Turkish mobile market; an important commonality in different package
options that are provided by the Turkish IMNOs has been the disparity in the per-minute prices of on-net and
off-net calls (see for example, Table C1 for Turkcell tariffs).23 The asymmetry in the MNOs subscriber bases,
therefore, has been generating a tariff-mediated externality in favor of the IMNOs that have larger subscriber
bases. Competitive response from the EMNOs to the tariff-mediated externalities has been to charge a
uniform price for on-net and off-net calls. However, such a response has a potential to eliminate the subscriber
base disadvantage of the EMNOs only to the extent that they can offer comparable off-net prices to the23Currently (May 2006), Turkcell provides a plan in which per minute off-net calls (to other MNOs) are priced more than double of the
in-net prices. Similarly, Telsim provides a plan in which per minute off-net calls are priced almost triple of the on-net calls. However, the
rates they provide for fixed-line calls are the same as on-net calls. This can be explained by the fact that in Turkey, fixed and mobile
networks are usually perceived as complements, and that a substantial part of the competition in telecoms takes place between MNOs. By
charging the on-net price to fixed-line calls, IMNOs appeal to the customers. Turkcell also provides a package called ‘‘Uniform price’’,
with which it offers a single price regardless of the call termination. As one can expect, per-minute prices are higher than on-net calls in
other packages and, the monthly fixed fee is four times higher than its standard package.
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they have to pay to the designated MNO. As argued below, this ability was seriously hampered by high
termination charges.
In most countries termination tariffs that incumbent fixed operators can charge on calls terminating in their
networks are regulated, often set equal to some estimate of costs. There seems to be an overall agreement that
under these circumstances mobile operators have incentives to set sub-optimal termination charges on fixed-
to-mobile (FTM) calls.24 There seems to be less agreement on the economics of termination of mobile-to-
mobile (MTM) calls and the appropriate regulatory remedies, if any. Concerns about excessive termination
charges have led regulators in many countries also to intervene in the determination of MTM termination
charges (or, at least, not to treat them differently from FTM termination charges).25
Implications of MNOs’ ability to discriminate between on-net and off-net calls has created some debate in
the academic literature. Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998) suggested when MNOs compete for subscribers
through two-part tariffs and can discriminate between on-net and off-net calls, they would agree to set
reciprocal access charges equal to costs. In Gans and King (2001), MNOs set reciprocal access charges below
cost to dampen competition for subscribers. Hence, in their model, MTM termination charges are actually
‘‘too low’’.26 However, this prediction is not supported by cross-country evidence: Most such evidence
suggests that MTM termination charges are high relative to costs. It was in fact this evidence that prompted
regulators to regulate MTM charges in the first place.
The Turkish case suggests that the interesting dimension of tariff-mediated network externalities may
be the role they may play in hindering entry. The issue of entry was examined in Section 6 of Laffont et al.
(1998). They examine a market where the incumbent has full coverage and a new entrant chooses its coverage
and incurs an investment cost and show that if the entrants’ planned coverage is small enough, then an
incumbent can blockade entry. Calzada and Valletti (2005) show that under the threat of entry, assuming
that the terms of interconnection cannot discriminate between incumbents and entrants, IMNOs setting
reciprocal MTM termination charges may be induced to distort termination charges upwards. Under the
threat of entry, incumbents face a trade-off. On the one hand, ex-post competition pushes them to set
termination charges at or below cost. However, ex-ante, this increases the attractiveness of new entry. For
some values of entry costs, IMNOs may prefer to deter entry by setting MTM charges above cost. Gabrielsen
and Vagstad (2005) also present a model where high termination charges may act as a barrier to entry.
In their model, incumbents may set terminating charges above cost even in the absence of entry threats.
When entry is possible, high termination charges can be used to deter or limit entry. Two assumptions drive
their results: exogenous switching costs and the existence of calling clubs, that is, groups of people that have
a bias towards calling each other, creating unbalances in calling patterns. It will be argued below that
the behavior of the incumbents in the Turkish mobile market is broadly consistent with the predictions of
these models.
4.2.1. The interconnection regime
Since the ultimate cause of tariff-mediated externalities are above-cost MTM termination charges, the
analysis now shifts to the interconnection regime in Turkey and the determination of MTM charges. When
Turkcell and Telsim obtained their GSM licenses in 1998, they signed interconnection agreements with Turk
Telekom and among themselves. In these agreements, termination charges for MTM (and MTF) calls were set24See, for example, Rey and Jullien (2004): ‘‘It is generally accepted that mobile operators have a joint interest in increasing fixed to
mobile (F2M) termination rates, so as to extract revenue from the fixed-line operator(s)’’. In reality, rerouting of calls through GSM
gateways constrains the degree to which charges for FTM calls can deviate from those of on-net MTM calls. This, in turn, constrains
MNOs’ ability to raise FTM termination above costs. The authors thank an anonymous referee for bringing up the possibility of rerouting
arbitrage.
25As of August 2006, most countries in Western Europe had imposed some sort of controls on mobile termination rates such as
transparency, non-discrimination and cost orientation. Some (including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Italy, Lithuania,
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, UK) had imposed explicit ‘‘glide paths’’ to reduce MTRs over specified period of time
(Cullen International, Western Europe Cross Country Analysis, available at www.cullen-international.com). In all Western European
countries but Finland MTM and FTM termination charges are equal.
26Calzada and Valletti (2005) show that this result is sensitive to modeling assumptions: when operators compete in utilities rather than
prices, then termination rates are set equal to costs.
ARTICLE IN PRESS
I˙ Atiyas, P. Dog˘an / Telecommunications Policy 31 (2007) 502–523 513at 1.4 cent/min.27 The termination charge remained at that level until March 2001, when, just before Aria and
Aycell entered the market, Turkcell and Telsim renewed their interconnection agreement and increased the
terminating charges to 20 cent/min. The new entrants signed interconnection agreements among themselves
and with the incumbents at 20 cent/min as well. This level was in line with developments in Europe. According
to the European Commission (2003, Fig. 21), the weighted average of mobile call termination charges for SMP
operators was 20.5 eurocents in 2001 and 18.8 in 2002.28
In view of the fact that high termination rates may create disadvantages for new entrants in the mobile
market, one could have expected that Aria and Aycell seek lower charges and ask for the TA’s intervention if
necessary. Even though at the time the TA had not yet issued a regulation on interconnection, Law No. 4502
did endow it with the power to intervene and if necessary impose the terms of an agreement if parties in an
interconnection negotiation did not reach an agreement. Aria or Aycell did not file a formal application. One
possible explanation is that the new entrants thought high termination rates could generate high revenues
from calls originating from rival networks.29 In hindsight, it seems that Aria overlooked the potential
deterrent effect of tariff mediated network externalities on its ability to acquire new subscriptions.
Another issue raised by the Turkish case is the welfare implications of asymmetries in the termination
charges of different mobile operators. In a model of competition between a ‘‘strong’’ and a ‘‘weak’’ operator,30
and where operators discriminate between on-net and off-net calls. Peitz (2005) shows that allowing a
termination markup to the weak operator, while regulating the termination charge of the strong operator at
cost, improves consumer welfare and the weak operator’s profits. However, the reduction in the strong
operator’s profits is even larger so that total welfare declines.
The tendency of the TA has also been to introduce asymmetries in the mobile termination charges. In May
2003 the TA issued an Ordinance on Access and Interconnection. The Ordinance reiterated the TA’s role of
dispute resolution in case parties failed to reach interconnection agreements and it also required that existing
interconnection agreements be renewed. In June 2003 the TA issued a ‘‘Communique´ on Principles Regarding
the Determination of Operators with SMP’’. Soon after, TA designated Turkcell as having SMP in the market
for mobile telecommunications services and both Turkcell and Telsim in the ‘‘mobile call termination
market’’.
This time the mobile operators could not reach an agreement. The TA intervened and in October 2003 set
the termination rates at 233,750 TL (about 14 eurocent/min, see Table 3) for calls from Turkcell and Telsim to
Aycell and Avea and at 178,750 TL (about 11 eurocent/min) for calls from the new entrants to incumbents.
Hence termination charges for SMP and non-SMP operators were not symmetric. In the European Union, in
July 2003, the weighted average of mobile termination charges was 13.7 eurocent/min for SMP operators, and
about 16.4 eurocent/min for non-SMP operators (European Commission 2004, Fig. 32). Hence the charges
determined by the TA were somewhat lower than those in Europe.
The interconnection arrangement between Turk Telekom and the mobile operators also changed in 2003. In
the renewed agreement, Turk Telekom’s termination charge was set at 3.2 and 4.5 cents and that of the FTM
calls at 13.5 eurocents (see Table 3). Relative to the European practice, this meant that the new arrangement
put the mobile operators at a serious disadvantage: The MTF termination charge was much higher than the
European average of about 0.9 and 1.5 eurocents for single and double tandem interconnection charges,
respectively. By contrast, the FTM charge is somewhat below average. Why did the mobile operators accept
this arrangement? Kibar (2005) referes to an earlier Council of State decision mandating that FTM and MTF27In the case of MTF calls, this was true for ‘‘within area’’ calls whereas termination charge for ‘‘outside area’’ calls was set at 2.5 cents/
min. The terms ‘‘within area’’ and ‘‘outside area’’ refer to the level at which calls are handed over to the fixed network. This two-way
classification is different from the classification employed in most of Europe (as well as European Commission documents), namely local,
single transit and double transit. Roughly, ‘‘within area’’ interconnection lies between local and single transit. Similarly, ‘‘outside area’’
refers to an interconnection level that lies between single and double transit. Termination charges for FTM calls were calculated through a
complicated formula that eventually caused a legal battle between TTAS and the mobile operators.
28The table reports fixed-to-mobile termination charges but also notes that except for a few cases rates do not differ according to the
nature of the network that the call originates from.
29This was suggested by a former official of Aria in personal communication.
30A strong operator is distinguished from a weak operator by the fact that at symmetric prices, subscribers obtain higher utility by
consuming the services of the strong operator.
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Table 3
Call termination charges (2003–2004)
Eurocent per minute charges for call termination
Actual SIRT (see Appendix Table B1) EU averages (July 2003)
Fixed-to-mobile 13.5a 8.3 (SMP opr.) 13.7 (SMP opr.)
16.4 (non-SMP opr.)
Mobile-to-fixed
Within area 4.5 2.2 0.97 (single tandem)
Outside area 3.2 3.2 1.67 (double tandem)
Mobile-to-mobile
IMNOs 10.9 8.3 (SMP opr.) 13.7
EMNOs 14.3 – 16.4
Source: Compiled from Kibar (2005) and European Commission (2004).
aExcept for Aria. The charge was 18 eurocents for Aria.
I˙ Atiyas, P. Dog˘an / Telecommunications Policy 31 (2007) 502–523514charges be symmetric, and suggests that the mobile operators were worried that any disruption in the
negotiation might lead to intervention by the administrative courts and result in symmetric charges.
In October 2004, the TA announced a Standard Interconnection Reference Tariff (SIRT). Tariffs identified
in the SIRT for 2004 are listed in column 3 of Table 3 (see Appendix B for details). These charges reflect an
important difference in the TA’s approach to interconnection in the fixed and mobile markets. The table
shows that call origination and call termination charges specified for Turk Telekom in Turkey are clearly
higher those in the European Union. By contrast, the call termination on SMP mobile operators are
significantly lower than those in the European Union. For example, the 7.5 eurocents envisaged for after
October 2005 (see Appendix Table B1) would be among the lowest rates in Europe (actually the third lowest,
according to European Commission, 2006, Fig. 32).
It is evident from this discussion that the regulator’s attitude towards developing competition in the fixed
and mobile markets was not the same. With respect to interconnection between TTAS and GSM operators
with SMP, the TA seems to have taken an approach that is more protective of the interests of fixed incumbent
operator, at least if one takes the European Union as a benchmark. With respect to incumbents versus new
entrants in the mobile industry, TA is tougher towards the IMNOs relative to the practice in Europe.
However, until 2003 EMNOs did not seek intervention of the TA and accepted the high MTM charges offered
by the IMNOs. This created a wedge between the costs of on-net and off-net calls and generated tariff
mediated network externalities. As discussed next, this limited EMNOs’ ability to compete with IMNOs.
4.2.2. Price competition
The analysis now focuses on the pricing behavior of the IMNOs and the EMNOs. There were two trends
that need to be underlined (a more detailed discussion and data can be found in Appendix C). The first was
that the evolution of price competition was significantly influenced by the interconnection regime. Second,
while new entry did have a competitive effect on prices, it seems the impact was more limited than what was
initially envisaged.
Right after the increase in the interconnection charges from 1.4 to 20US cent/min, and right before Aria’s
entry, Turkcell launched a new calling package called Biz Bize Cell, where the monthly fixed fee was reduced
from about 2.5 to 1 euro, and per-minute charges for on-net calls were reduced from about 22 to 11 eurocents,
while per-minute charges for off-net calls were increased from about 29 to 34 eurocents (see Appendix C,
Table C1). On-net charges remained at about 11–13 eurocents until early 2002, after which they increased to
14–17 eurocents.
At the time of entry, Aria’s on-net charges were substantially higher than those of Turkcell (about 32
eurocents in March, steadily declining to 20–21 eurocents by the end of 2001, largely due to the depreciation of
the Turkish Lira). While on-net and off-net prices were equal, on-net calls were offered a discount after a total
of 55min/month. In December 2002 Aria launched a new campaign reducing the charges for both types of
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Fig. 2. Mobile call per-minute charges (eurocents).
I˙ Atiyas, P. Dog˘an / Telecommunications Policy 31 (2007) 502–523 515calls to an extreme low of 7–8 eurocent/min. For off-net calls this meant that Aria was making a loss, since the
tariff was below the termination charge Aria had to pay to its rivals. This lasted only a few months, after
which charges for off-net calls were raised to over 35 eurocents. After the merger, Avea had two basic
packages: a package that did not discriminate between on-net and off-net calls and another that did. Overall,
(as reflected in Fig. 2 below), Avea tariffs were about 25–35% lower than those of Turkcell (see Appendix C
for details).31
Some evidence for the path of call charges are displayed in Figs. 2 and 3.32 Making sense out of operators’
published tariffs is difficult because of the range of different packages they offer and existence of non-
linearities due to fixed fees, discounts, etc. The analysis attempts to focus on cheapest packages offered by the
operators, and those designed for consumers rather than businesses. Fig. 2 compares per-minute prices of the
dominant incumbent, Turkcell, and the new entrant Aria (and Avea, once Aria and Aycell merged). Fig. 2
shows that Turkcell’s tariffs for on-net calls declined compared to the pre-entry period and, overall, those for
off-net calls increased. Aria provided non-discriminatory charges until early 2003. The figure also shows that
Aria/Avea off-net tariffs and on-net tariffs were respective of Turkcell tariffs, but Aria off-net tariffs were
significantly higher than Turkcell on-net tariffs. Because of Aria’s much smaller subscriber base, consumers
are likely to compare Aria off-net tariffs with Turkcell on-net tariffs.
The information revealed by Fig. 2 may be misleading if read in isolation because of non-linearities.
One usually tries to get around this by defining a basket of calls and calculate its cost, assuming that the
basket reflects the consumption pattern of an average consumer of the operator. This is done in Fig. 3 where
the basket is defined as 100 calls (per month), each 3min long. It is further assumed that for each operator,
the ratio of on-net calls is equal to its market share. The figure shows that initially calls from Aria were much
more expensive than those from Turkcell, but eventually they became cheaper. Note that the comparison is31Telsim’s response to new entry was similar to that of Turkcell. In fact, the first package that Telsim launched in the face of new entry
(Cep-Transfer) was exactly the same (in TL) of that of Turkcell’s new package. Telsim tariffs remained very close to those of Turkcell
throughout 2001. The tariffs in the later years were similar to that of Turkcell overall, except that Telsim generally offered a richer menu of
non-linear tariffs with different mixes of fixed fees and per-minute charges. Also Telsim introduced a non-discriminatory package earlier
than Turkcell.
32In the second half of November 2000 Turkey experienced a financial turmoil, which was followed by the collapse of the exchange rate
on February 23, 2001. The value of euro almost doubled from November 2000 to April 2001. Therefore, the sharp drop in euro prices from
November 2000 to April 2001 in Fig. 3 (from euro 35.36 to euro 16.08) was in large part due to the depreciation of TL. The price decrease
was only 17% in TL terms (from TL 20.8 million to TL 17.3 million).
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I˙ Atiyas, P. Dog˘an / Telecommunications Policy 31 (2007) 502–523516sensitive to the size of the basket: With a smaller number of calls, effect of the Aria discount (for calls after the
first 55min) would have been diminished and the Aria package may become more expensive.
As can be seen from the discussion above, Aria’s interconnection agreements and the high call termination
charges that they entailed seriously constrained Aria’s ability to compete with the incumbent through tariffs.
Due to the tariff-mediated externalities, the relevant price comparison from the consumers’ perspective was
the one between on-net prices of Turkcell (the large IMNO) and the off-net prices of Aria (the small EMNO).
But the degree to which Aria could lower its off-net prices was limited by the high termination charges. In
addition to the interconnection regime, it seems that Aria’s inability to more rapidly expand its subscriber base
can also be partly explained by its own strategic mistakes, both in pricing (which seems overly non-aggressive
especially in the first year after entry) and in negotiating termination charges.
Finally, almost a year after the end of Phase II, Turkish mobile market stood as one of the most expensive
among the OECD in terms of mobile telecommunication prices. The data used for this comparison is provided
by OECD (2005). OECD defines three baskets, low usage, medium usage, and high usage, to compare mobile
communication prices.33 The comparisons use the least-expensive offers made by the largest operator (in terms
of market share) in each country, measured in USD, using PPP for 2004.
The last year of Phase II was 2003, during which four MNOs were active in the Turkish mobile market. In
this year, Turkcell, which is the largest operator in Turkey, had the highest PPP adjusted price for the low
usage basket, USD 279.77, among all OECD countries (the OECD average was USD 203.88). For both
medium and high usage baskets, Turkcell has the third highest PPP adjusted prices with USD 909.43 and USD
1766.93, respectively, among the OECD countries in August 2004 (the OECD averages for medium and high
usage baskets were USD 556.40 and USD 964.10, respectively).
4.3. Switching costs and number portability
Presence and magnitude of switching costs affect decisions of both attached and non-attached customers.
Attached customers (to the incumbent network) may be reluctant to switch to the entrant’s network in the
presence of high switching costs, even if the latter provides more attractive terms. However, switching costs
also affect the choice of the non-attached new customers. Consider a non-attached customer who is about to
subscribe either to network A or network B, and assume that currently network A offers more attractive terms
overall. In the absence of switching costs, the customer would subscribe to network A, since she can easily33See OECD (2005, p. 173) for a detailed description of those baskets.
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bases her decision only on the current factors. However, in the presence of significant switching costs,
consumers’ expectations on the relevant factors (e.g., future installed base of the network and future tariffs)
play an important role. In that sense, a current and a significant asymmetry in the subscriber bases is likely to
favor the larger MNO.
It already has been stated that switching may not be desirable from a large network to a smaller one when
there are network effects (in particular, tariff mediated network effects). However, switching to a different
mobile operator may not be desirable even in the absence of any network effects.34 As listed by Shy (2002),
there are at least there sources of switching costs in the mobile telecoms,35 (i) incompatible standards, (ii)
number (non-) portability, and (iii) penalties due to (early) termination of subscription.
The first type of switching cost, which arises when operators have different standards so that consumers
need to purchase new equipment upon switching providers, did not exist at the period of new entry.36 There
are (and were) no substantial penalties for early termination of subscription by either of the Turkish mobile
operators, and hence, number non-portability seems to be the most important source of a switching cost in the
Turkish mobile market.37
The TA included number portability into its work plan of 2004 and originally envisaged that it would be
implemented by October 2005. This deadline has been shifted a few times and, as of November 2006, it has not
yet been implemented.38 The absence of number portability seems to be the most glaring regulatory failure.5. Concluding remarks
Turkey was a late starter in telecommunications liberalization. Competition in fixed-line markets was put on
hold for a long time. Even though Turkey has had a longer experience with some degree of competition in the
mobile industry, it has been impossible to challenge the stronghold of the dominant operator.
The attitude of both the Ministry and the regulatory authority towards the mobile industry favored the new
entrants, as reflected in both the roaming and interconnection policies. There were possibly two
political–economic reasons for this. The first had to do with the fact that the fixed-incumbent operator,
Turk Telekom, was a new entrant in the mobile market. It is generally believed that Turk Telekom had
significant influence on the Ministry. The second had to do with the fact that TIM represented till then the
largest foreign direct investment in Turkey. Interestingly, the authorities also had proper legal bases for both
the roaming and interconnection policies.
The most important policy lesson that can be drawn from the Turkish experience is that in an industry like
mobile communications where network externalities and switching costs are important, delaying new entry
creates first-mover advantages for incumbents which may be difficult to reverse. The Turkish authorities
waited for too long before issuing new licenses. Promoting simultaneous rather than sequential entry is more
likely to generate a competitive environment. The big advantage of simultaneous over sequential entry is that
competition is initiated on a level playing field, before tariff mediated network externalities and switching costs
take hold.
Given that new entry was delayed, the authorities used both roaming and interconnection policies as
remedies to enhance competition. Imposition of roaming obligations on the incumbents proved ineffective and
the IMNOs were able to use the legal system to prevent rapid implementation. The roaming experience34Farrell and Klemperer (2004) argue that switching-cost markets can tip like network effect markets. If, for example, a larger firm has
lower marginal cost, so that it may charge a lower price than its smaller rivals, this advantage (even initially small) can be magnified and
the positive feedback dynamics can result in complete dominance by the large firm.
35See Shy (2002); the author provides a method with which unobserved switching costs can be calculated from observed prices and
market sizes, and applies it to estimate the switching cost between two incumbent operators, Pelephone to Cellcom, in the Israeli mobile
telecom market.
36As mentioned earlier, during Phase I, Turkcell engaged in exclusive dealing agreements with equipment manufacturers, which did
create switching cost, as consumers who were to switch from Turkcell to Telsim had to buy a new equipment.
37See Buehler, Dewenter, and Haucap (2006) for the competitive effects of number portability in the European mobile markets.
38Recently the President of the TA has announced that work on number portability was nearing completion and the policy would be
implemented by the end of 2006 (The daily Hurriyet, August 22, 2006).
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have been successful if it was imposed not as an afterthought but included in the original concession
agreements of the IMNOs. That would have greatly reduced and even eliminated any future legal uncertainty
by obviating the necessity to what amounts to renegotiating the original bargain. Hence, to the extent possible,
remedies such as mandatory roaming should be included in the original licenses to minimize future legal
uncertainty. The second is the importance of the level of expertise and cohesiveness of the overall legal
environment. Having the correct regulations is not sufficient if the legal environment allows opportunistic
behavior, loopholes, and challenges. As discussed above, one way to improve the legal environment is to
ensure that appeal bodies have sufficient expertise. In the Turkish case, this would mean that the Council of
State should be the sole appeal body and should be endowed by sufficient expertise.
Regarding interconnection policy, this paper has argued that the TA’s attitude was pro-competitive, at least
as far as MTM termination charges were concerned and in comparison to contemporary policy in Europe. The
reason interconnection policy proved ineffective in the initial years of new entry in compensating for tariff-
mediated network externalities was that EMNOs accepted the interconnection offer proposed by the IMNOs
rather than seek lower rates or apply for dispute resolution. It seems clear that this was a mistaken strategy
and did not serve EMNOs own interests. The question then arises whether this mistake could have been
prevented by regulatory intervention. For example, one alternative approach, at least for the initial years,
could have been a more heavy-handed regulation where the regulator would intervene not only in case there is
a dispute, but by setting charges directly. In hindsight, such an on-hands attitude could have worked better for
the EMNOs. At the same time, such an approach would have been against the main international tendency,
which was (and still is) in the direction of more light-handed regulation. Also, it is debatable whether a
regulatory authority ought to seek to correct possible mistakes by private corporations. A better approach
could be for the regulator to adopt a more active communications policy, that is, provide better guidance and
reveal more clearly its views and expectations on how competition may develop in the industry and where
main hindrances may lie.
It has been argued above that switching costs are an important characteristic of mobile markets. Given the
fact that switching costs increase the value of first-mover advantages, and given the long delay in allowing new
entry, number portability should have been an integral part of measures to enhance competition. This remedy
has not been adopted and needs to be adopted in the future.
Given the strategy of sequential entry, the Turkish authorities tried to use correct remedies to promote
competition in the mobile telecommunications industry, with the exception of failure to introduce number
portability. In hindsight, however, sequential entry was the original sin and remedies proved insufficient to
reverse the first-mover advantages.
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Appendix A. The inability of Turkish authorities to enforce national roaming policy
Upon acquiring its entry license, Is-Tim held negotiations for roaming with the IMNOs between November
2000 and March 2001 but no agreements were reached. Following an application by Is-Tim for dispute
resolution, the TA told the parties in May 2001 to reach an agreement within 4 weeks or else the TA was going
to determine the terms and conditions of an agreement. The parties failed again and in October 2001, and as
required by Law No. 4502, the TA determined the terms and conditions of the roaming agreement and asked
the parties to accept these terms or else reach an agreement on their own terms by November 2001. Is-Tim
announced that it accepted the terms and conditions determined by the TA. Turkcell and Telsim filed
applications with the court and obtained preliminary injunction decisions on the terms and conditions
determined by the TA. Turkcell then applied for international arbitration at the International Chamber of
Commerce’s (ICC) International Court of Arbitration with the request that Turkcell had no obligation to
sign a roaming agreement with the terms and conditions determined by the TA. Telsim also applied for
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Making Roaming Agreements and asked again Turkcell to sign a roaming agreement with Is-Tim in 30 days.
Turkcell again obtained injunctions and applied for international arbitration for a second time.
In March 2003 Is-Tim filed a lawsuit with the ICC against the TA asking for about 3 billion USD in
damages because promised roaming services had not been made available. The CEO of TIM was quoted as
saying that if the regulatory framework regarding roaming remains as it is, TIM might consider withdrawing
from Turkey. The lawsuit was subsequently withdrawn when, following negotiations between the Italian
Prime Minister Berlusconi and the Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan, in June 2003 it was announced that Is-
Tim and Aycell would merge to form TT&TIM. TT&TIM was formally established in February 2004; in June
2004 the company created Avea, a new brand name under which services were provided. In the meantime, the
International Court of Arbitration rejected all of Turkcell’s and Telsim’s applications.
If roaming policy was going to be of any use at all it had to be implemented fast, especially since EMNOs’
concession agreements required them to roll out their own networks (so as to reach a coverage ratio of 50% in
3 years and 90% in 5 years). Delays in implementation meant that the IMNOs could further reinforce their
first-mover advantages by further expanding their subscriber base, before new entry could pose a threat.
Hence, any delays that IMNOs could generate through legal challenges greatly reduced any additional effect
roaming could have had in developing effective competition. Two factors help explain why IMNOs were
successful in delaying enforcement. The first factor is lack of cohesion, consistency and expertise/experience in
the legal system. In hindsight, it was the civil courts’ injunctions against TA’s decisions regarding the roaming
dispute that played a critical role in delays. Application for international arbitration alone would not have
resulted in delays, as they would not have prevented the TA from executing its decisions. It is generally agreed
in Turkey that a civil court does not have the authority to adjudicate administrative acts and therefore should
not have issued injunctions against TA’s decisions on roaming disputes. Given time, this decision of the civil
court would have been corrected through the appeals process but by that time the economic effect of roaming
policy would have been reduced to nil. Consequently, the second, and more important, factor behind the
inability to enforce roaming policy was a lack of foresight. Roaming obligations should have been included in
the original concessions granted to Turkcell and Telsim in 1998.39
Such a remedy would have greatly reduced subsequent legal uncertainty and would have prevented future
opportunistic behavior by the IMNOs. Furthermore, IMNOs saw the imposition of roaming obligations
only 2 years after obtaining concession contracts as an extra cost and not as part of the original bargain
(if anything, they possibly saw it as a violation of the original bargain), and felt justified in delaying
implementation through any means available.
The CA got involved in the roaming issue as well. Is-Tim filed a complaint with the CA in December 2001
claiming that Turkcell and Telsim had abused their dominant position by refusing to provide roaming
services. While the main legal issue in the developments described above was whether the TA had the authority
to impose roaming obligations (presumably which were not specified in the licenses Turkcell and Telsim had
obtained in 1998), here the issue was whether refusal to provide roaming was a violation of Competition Law.
The CA concluded the investigation a year and a half later, in June 2003 and found both Turkcell and Telsim
in violation of the Competition Law, fined Turkcell USD 15.4 million and Telsim USD 6.1 million.
In its roaming decision, the Competition Board first investigated whether Turkcell and Telsim have joint
dominance40 over the GSM infrastructure market and concluded that they did. The Board then argued that
Turkcell and Telsim had effectively refused providing roaming services and that this refusal amounted to an
abuse of dominant position by denying access to an essential facility.
As a general rule, the essential facility argument is used for cases where the competing firm lacks a realistic
ability to duplicate a facility that it needs to provide its services. In the roaming case Is-Tim eventually had to
duplicate facilities in question by its license condition. Hence the Board argument had to be that full roll out of
the facility would take time and that the passage of time would make it more difficult for Is-Tim to attract39Another hypothesis could be that this was not a case of lack of foresight but of intentional opportunism, that is, that the government
knowingly excluded roaming obligations from the initial concessions to make these contracts more attractive to the IMNOs, only to renege
later. There is no evidence of such opportunism.
40Joint dominance is defined as ability of operators to behave as a single operator by coordinating their actions.
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infrastructure in a short period of time (say, 1 year). The argument was that delays in attaining full coverage
would seriously increase the cost of attracting subscribers, and the resulting delay in revenues would
jeopardize the viability of the company and reduce its ability to compete with the incumbents.Appendix B. SIRT
The SIRT was announced by the TA in October 2004. The SIRT included call origination and termination
charges that would be applicable to Turk Telecom and call termination charges for mobile operators with
SMP. The SIRT does not bind operators, that is, operators may set their charges freely in bilateral agreements.
However, it is generally understood that if operators fail to conclude interconnection agreements and apply to
the TA for dispute resolution, then the TA will likely impose the charges determined in the SIRT. As of July
2006, the tariffs determined in the SIRT have not yet been applicable in the mobile industry. As discussed in
the text, the charges in SIRT reflect an important difference in the TA’s approach to interconnection in the
fixed and mobile markets. To summarize, call origination and call termination charges specified for Turk
Telekom were clearly higher those in the European Union. By contrast, the call termination on SMP mobile
operators were significantly lower than those in the European Union. At the same time, the SIRT envisaged
that charges would decline over time, as reflected in Table B1. The TA renewed the SIRT in 2006 and the new
charges would be valid as of June 2, 2006. By that time, all mobile operators were designated as possessing
SMP in the market for call termination. The new SIRT specified different termination charges for the three
operators: as shown in the table charges decline with operators’ market share. Overall, it can also be
underlined that these charges are among the lowest charges available in Europe in October 2005 (compare for
example with European Commission, 2006, Fig. 32).Appendix C. Pricing behavior of IMNOs and EMNOs
Right after the change in the interconnection agreement between Turkcell and Telsim, which increased the
termination charges from 1.4 to 20 US cent/min, Turkcell launched a new calling package significantly
reducing the price of on-net calls and increasing the price of off-net calls (see Table C1). Through this new
package, called Biz Bize Cell, the monthly fixed fee was reduced from about 2.5 to 1 euro (from 2.5 to less than
1 million TL) and the per-minute charge for on-net calls from about 22 to 11 eurocents (0.2 to 0.1 million TL).
By contrast, charges for off-net calls were increased from 29 to 34 eurocents (from 0.25 to about 0.3
million TL).41
Between 2001 and 2005 monthly fixed charges remained constant in TL terms (and decreased by about one
half in euros). On-net charges remained at about 11–13 eurocents until early 2002, after which they increased
to between 14 and 17 eurocents afterwards. Off-net prices similarly increased to over 45 eurocents in 2002, and
to an average of about 40 eurocents. Note that these rates are well above the rates which prevailed before new
entry, reflecting the impact of increased competition.
One important change in the off-net calls after 2004 is that calls to the fixed operator are charged the same
rate as on-net calls. Interestingly, all Turkcell tariffs discriminated significantly between on-net and off-net
calls; Turkcell did not introduce a non-discriminatory package until 2004. As one can expect, in the non-
discriminatory package that is currently offered by Turkcell, per-minute prices are higher than on-net calls in
other packages and, the monthly fixed fee is four times higher than its standard package. Therefore, the
package is likely to appeal only to limited number of subscribers, if any.
Table C2 provides some data on Aria’s tariff policy. Aria entered the market through what was called a
‘‘promotional package’’: the package had no monthly subscription charge. On-net charges were set at 0.28
million TL; this corresponded to about 32 eurocents in March 2001 and declined steadily to about 20–21
eurocents by the end of 2001. These rates were substantially higher than the on-net calls of Turkcell.41Note that the TL depreciated sharply during that period. Hence in principle comparisons based on euros is more informative than
those in TLs. Nevertheless, one should expect less than full pass through from exchange rate movements to TL values.
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Table C1
Turkcell tariffs and post-paid packages (including VAT)
Datesa Standard cell package Biz bize cell package
Eurocent Eurocent per minute Eurocent Eurocent per minute
Fixed fee On-net On-net (disc.) Off-net Fixed fee On-net On-net (disc.) Off-net
March 1, 2000 455.7 23.6 19.9 29.5
August 23, 2000 435.0 28.2 23.9 35.9
January 3, 2001 402.9 28.2 24.0 35.9
March 3, 2001 297.6 23.4 19.9 29.7
March 23, 2001 291.9 22.9 19.9 29.2 109.0 11.4 11.4 33.9
May 15, 2001 252.7 25.8 22.0 32.8 94.4 9.8 9.8 29.3
June 13, 2001 251.9 25.7 21.9 27.5 94.1 13.3 13.3 39.2
August 28, 2001 198.0 22.4 21.2 28.7 74.0 11.6 11.6 34.7
November 17, 2001 190.9 24.4 23.2 31.3 71.3 13.0 13.0 38.0
February 12, 2002 210.9 27.0 25.6 34.6 78.8 17.3 17.3 48.5
June 12, 2002 181.6 30.4 28.1 36.7 67.8 16.2 16.2 45.7
March 1, 2003 147.4 25.9 23.8 31.3 55.0 13.7 13.7 39.0
April 15, 2004 170.5 29.1 26.9 33.8 59.4 15.4 15.4 42.1
November–December 2004 145.9 25.5 23.5 29.7 50.8 13.7 13.7 37.1
November 2005 46.7 21.2 21.2 31.1 59.7 16.8 16.8 37.4
Calls to PSTN are charged as same rate as on-net calls.
aFor 2000–2003, dates refer to days when tariffs are launched or changed. For 2004–2005, dates refer to months when tariffs are
observed.
Table B1
Standard interconnection reference tariffs set by the TA (net of taxes)
Effective during Eurocent per minute charges
Call origination and call termination on TT Call termination on GSM (for SMP operators)
Within area Outside area
10/01/04–12/31/04a 2.2 3.2 8.3
01/01/05–09/30/05a 1.8 2.7 7.9
10/01/05a 1.1 2 7.5
06/02/2006b 1.02 1.89 7.14 for Turkcell
7.76 for Vodafone
8.93 for Avea
Source: Telecommunications authority.
aConverted to euro with the Turkish Central Bank rate of October 1, 2004.
bConverted to euro with the Turkish Central Bank rate of June 2, 2006.
I˙ Atiyas, P. Dog˘an / Telecommunications Policy 31 (2007) 502–523 521The package contained a quantity discount: calls made after a total of 55min/month were charged at
approximately 45% of regular calls. In December 2002 Aria launched a new campaign, this time reducing both
on-net and off-net charges to an extreme low of 0.12 million TL (about 7–8 eurocent/min). For off-net calls to
other mobile operators, this was below the termination rate Aria had to pay to its rivals, hence Aria was
making a loss on these calls. This lasted only for a few months and by March 2003 the charge on off-net calls
were increased to over 35 eurocents. After the merger Avea had two basic packages: in one package on-net
calls were charged a low rate of 7–9 eurocents and off-net calls at around 28–40 eurocents depending on the
exchange rate. In the other, there was a non-discriminatory charge of 18–20 eurocents both for on-net and off-
net calls. This package seems to target those subscribers who may place a large number of off-net calls; higher
on-net prices are used to cross-subsidize lower tariffs on off-net calls. Evidence seems to suggest that high
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Table C2
Aria–Avea packages
Eurocent per minute
On-net On-net discount Off-net
Aria promotional package
21-March-01 32 14.4 32
1-July-2001 26 11.7 26
1-October-2001 19.6 8.8 19.6
6-December-2001 21.7 9.8 21.7
Aria Indirimli 55 package
1-July-2001 38.7 17.4 38.7
1-October-2001 32.6 14.7 32.6
6-December-2001 39.8 17.9 39.8
26-February-2002 49.1 22.1 49.1
1-July-2002 40.8 18.4 40.8
1-November-2002 38.8 17.5 38.8
5-December-2002 7.9 7.9 7.9
5-March-2003 6.7 6.7 35.8
15-April-2004 7.4 7.4 39.7
Avea Packages
November–December, 2004 6.4 6.4 27.5
November–December, 2004 17.8 17.8 17.8
November-2005 7.5 7.5 37.4
November-2005 22.1 22.1 22.1
I˙ Atiyas, P. Dog˘an / Telecommunications Policy 31 (2007) 502–523522termination charges has restricted the ability of Aria and Avea to compete aggressively by lowering tariffs.
In response, the operator has developed a menu of tariffs designed for subscribers with different profiles for
off-net calls.References
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